/

CVE-2024-58376

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

OS Command Injection (CWE-78) in Renovate Helm Manager

CVE-2024-58376

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-78

Impact:

Arbitrary Command Execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A command injection vulnerability in Renovate's helmv3 manager allows untrusted registryAliases keys to influence shell commands used during Helm repository operations. An attacker with commit access to a repository processed by Renovate may inject shell metacharacters and execute arbitrary commands in Renovate's execution environment.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in Renovate deployments that use the helmv3 manager and process repository-controlled configuration containing registryAliases. It becomes risky when alias keys are incorporated into shell command construction without adequate quoting, escaping, or argument isolation during Helm repository operations.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Renovate's helmv3 manager and its Helm repository management workflow
  • Required access: Commit access to a repository whose configuration is processed by the affected Renovate instance
  • Trigger point: Execution of a Helm repository add operation using manipulated registry alias data
  • Why exploitation is possible: Untrusted alias keys can reach shell command execution with insufficient separation from command syntax

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an OS command injection flaw, mapped to CWE-78. Application-controlled values from registryAliases are incorporated into a shell-invoked command without reliably treating them as data. When shell metacharacters are not safely neutralized or avoided through structured argument handling, repository-controlled input can alter command interpretation.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may execute arbitrary commands in the Renovate runtime
  • The Renovate execution environment could be fully compromised
  • Repository credentials, tokens, or configuration secrets could be exposed
  • Attackers could modify generated artifacts or project dependencies
  • Compromised automation could be used for lateral movement or supply-chain manipulation

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on removing shell interpretation from command execution and reducing trust in repository-controlled configuration.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Passing command arguments through structured process APIs rather than shell command strings
  • Applying strict validation and allowlisting to registry alias names
  • Treating repository configuration as untrusted input at every processing boundary
  • Running Renovate with least-privilege credentials, filesystem access, and network permissions
  • Isolating automation jobs and preventing access to unrelated secrets or control-plane interfaces
  • Applying secure-by-default process and container policies that limit command execution impact

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect similar issues through:

  • Static analysis rules for shell execution APIs receiving concatenated or interpolated input
  • Code review checks for unquoted configuration values used in command construction
  • Tests containing shell metacharacter cases to verify argument isolation and rejection behavior
  • Dependency and automation policies that restrict repository-controlled values from reaching privileged process execution
  • Runtime monitoring for unexpected child processes, Helm repository changes, network connections, or access to sensitive files

Automated code review and security scanning tools may help identify unsafe command-building patterns, but findings should be validated against the actual execution path.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/renovatebot/renovate/security/advisories/GHSA-rqgv-292v-5qgr
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/renovate-before-command-injection-via-helmv3

Frequently asked

questions

It can be exploitable through repository content processed by a Renovate instance, but exploitation generally depends on the attacker having commit access and the affected helmv3 workflow being enabled.

No direct host access is necessarily required. Commit access to a repository processed by Renovate may be sufficient if the manipulated configuration reaches the vulnerable command path.

Avoid shell interpretation by using structured process execution with independently validated arguments. Values that cannot be safely accepted should be rejected before they reach command execution.

Treat repository configuration as untrusted, enforce allowlists and schema validation, use least-privilege automation environments, and include command-injection tests and static analysis in development workflows.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.