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CVE-2024-52011

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.3)

Command Injection (CWE-77) in Node.js launch-editor

CVE-2024-52011

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-77, CWE-88

Impact:

Arbitrary Command Execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

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Summary

A command injection vulnerability in launch-editor allows arbitrary command execution on Windows when filenames containing special characters are passed to the launchEditor helper.

When an attacker can influence the file argument, they may craft a malicious filename that breaks out of the intended editor command and runs arbitrary system commands under the current user context.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in Node.js projects that use the launch-editor utility to open source files in an editor, typically in development tooling or frameworks such as bundlers and dev servers.

It becomes relevant when the file argument passed into launchEditor is derived from user-controllable data (e.g., HTTP query parameters, URLs, or other inputs) and the application runs on Windows.

The issue is tied to how the constructed editor command is passed to the Windows shell without robust escaping or validation, allowing special characters in filenames to alter command parsing behavior.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Node.js process that invokes launchEditor on Windows (often dev server tooling).
  • Required access: Ability to supply or control the file argument used by launchEditor—directly or indirectly (such as via HTTP handlers, debugging endpoints, or internal APIs).
  • Trigger point: The vulnerable call occurs when the application attempts to open a file in the editor, constructing a command line that includes the attacker-controlled filename.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The filename is interpolated into a shell command without sufficient sanitization or quoting, allowing shell metacharacters to terminate the intended command and inject additional commands (CWE-77/CWE-88).

Why this happens

At its core, this is a shell command injection problem: untrusted input is incorporated into a command string that is executed by the operating system shell.

The file argument, which can contain characters meaningful to the Windows command interpreter, is not properly escaped or validated before being concatenated into the editor launch command.

This aligns with CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command and CWE-88: Argument Injection or Modification, where attackers influence command-line arguments to alter behavior and cause unintended execution.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary commands under the privileges of the Node.js process
  • Reading, modifying, or deleting local files accessible to the affected user account
  • Installing or running additional malware or tooling on the developer machine or build agent
  • Pivoting to other systems via network tools available on the compromised host
  • Disruption of development or CI processes through destructive or resource-intensive commands

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating direct concatenation of untrusted data into shell commands and reducing the trust placed in filenames and paths.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Using APIs that execute commands without invoking a shell, passing arguments as separate parameters rather than a single string.
  • Strictly validating and normalizing filenames before use, rejecting or safely encoding dangerous characters and sequences.
  • Restricting which files can be opened by editor helpers (e.g., enforcing project-relative paths and whitelisting directories).
  • Running developer tooling and automation with least privilege to limit the blast radius of any command execution.
  • Treating any user-controllable path or filename as untrusted input and applying consistent sanitization routines.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically involves examining how command strings are constructed and where user input flows into process execution APIs.

Helpful approaches include:

  • Static analysis rules that flag usage of child_process.exec, spawn with shell mode, or similar APIs when arguments are derived from external input.
  • Code review checklists that call out command construction patterns, inline string interpolation, and lack of centralized escaping/validation for filenames.
  • Security policies that discourage shell-based invocation for utility functions and enforce safer execution primitives in shared tooling.
  • Automated scanning tools configured to trace tainted data from HTTP/request handlers into command execution sinks in Node.js applications.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/vitejs/launch-editor/commit/971291e8a6a91226e1616c5c0ec85423d2d50a5e
github.comgithub.com/vitejs/launch-editor/security/advisories/GHSA-c27g-q93r-2cwf
access.redhat.comaccess.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:34342
access.redhat.comaccess.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-52011
bugzilla.redhat.combugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2483853
security.access.redhat.comsecurity.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2024/cve-2024-52011.json

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, if a remote user can influence the file parameter passed to launchEditor (for example, via a dev server endpoint that opens files in an editor). If the parameter is only ever set locally, the risk is limited to local misuse or malicious projects.

The attacker needs the ability to control the filename passed into launchEditor while the application is running on Windows. This often means controlling HTTP request parameters or other inputs that the tooling translates into file values.

Avoid building shell command strings with untrusted data. Use non-shell process execution APIs with properly separated arguments, and enforce strict validation on any filenames or paths before they reach the editor helper.

Establish standards that treat all file paths and arguments as untrusted, use centralized sanitization utilities, prefer shell-free execution where possible, and integrate static analysis and security-focused code review into the development workflow for shared tooling.

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