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CVE-2024-47886

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

Unsafe Deserialization in Chamilo vchamilo Virtualization

CVE-2024-47886

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Unsafe Deserialization

CWE:

CWE-502

Impact:

Authenticated Remote Code Execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Chamilo's vchamilo virtualization plugin contains an unsafe PHAR deserialization flaw that can be triggered after authentication by abusing supported plugin features.

In affected versions, an authenticated administrator can reach a deserialization sink that processes attacker-controlled PHAR metadata, potentially leading to remote code execution on the Chamilo server.

Affected context

The vulnerability appears in Chamilo deployments that:

  • Run versions 1.11.12 through 1.11.26
  • Have the vchamilo virtualization plugin installed and accessible
  • Allow administrator-level users to configure or interact with plugin features that accept file or path inputs, including PHAR-based resources

The issue manifests in post-authentication flows where PHAR streams or files are processed in a way that allows PHP object deserialization from PHAR metadata.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Web application (Chamilo admin interface / vchamilo plugin features)
  • Required access: Valid authenticated Chamilo account with administrator-level privileges
  • Trigger point: Invoking a code path in vchamilo that performs PHAR-related file operations or deserialization on attacker-influenced input
  • Why exploitation is possible: The plugin's logic processes PHAR content in a context where PHP can automatically unserialize embedded metadata, and the application does not constrain or sanitize the types and behavior of deserialized objects.

Why this happens

The underlying issue is unsafe deserialization of untrusted or insufficiently validated data via PHAR handling in PHP.

PHAR archives can store serialized PHP objects inside their metadata; when certain filesystem or stream operations are performed on attacker-controlled PHAR resources, PHP may implicitly invoke unserialize() on that metadata.

In the vchamilo virtualization plugin, business logic allows user-controlled configuration or file references to reach this PHAR processing without applying strict validation or using safer data formats.

This aligns with CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data, where serialized objects from a partially trusted source are deserialized in a rich object environment containing gadget classes that can be abused to execute arbitrary code on deserialization.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary PHP code with the web server's privileges
  • Full compromise of the Chamilo application and underlying LMS data
  • Modification or deletion of course content, user records, and assessment data
  • Use of the Chamilo server as a pivot point for lateral movement within the hosting environment
  • Deployment of webshells or backdoors for persistent access

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on removing unsafe deserialization behavior and tightening how PHAR and serialized data are handled:

  • Avoid using PHP deserialization (unserialize() or implicit PHAR-based deserialization) on data that is influenced by user input, even from authenticated administrators.
  • Replace serialized object handling with safer, data-only formats (e.g., JSON or arrays) that do not trigger object construction.
  • Introduce strict allowlists for classes and operations that can be invoked as part of any remaining deserialization paths, or use hardened serializers that do not instantiate arbitrary objects.
  • Constrain plugin configuration surfaces so that file paths, stream wrappers, or archive references are validated against expected patterns and locations, disabling PHAR wrappers where not required.
  • Run the PHP application with least-privilege OS accounts and constrained file system permissions to limit the blast radius of any successful code execution.
  • Apply defense-in-depth controls such as application-level auditing and strict separation between administrative interfaces and sensitive system components.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection generally involves a mix of code-centric and operational techniques:

  • Static analysis: Configure SAST rules to flag uses of unserialize(), PHAR stream wrappers, and file functions that can implicitly deserialize PHAR metadata, especially when arguments are influenced by HTTP parameters or admin configuration fields.
  • Code review: During manual reviews, trace data flows in plugin and extension code from admin-facing inputs into filesystem operations or deserialization sinks; pay special attention to virtualization, backup/restore, and import/export features.
  • Configuration and policy checks: Implement security gates in CI/CD that block new code introducing unsafe deserialization patterns or PHAR usage without explicit justification.
  • Runtime monitoring: Use application logs, WAF rules, or RASP solutions to detect anomalous PHAR usage, suspicious admin actions involving unusual file paths, or execution of unexpected PHP functions linked to gadget chains.
  • Environment hardening checks: Periodically verify PHP configuration (e.g., stream wrapper availability) and file permissions against established security baselines to reduce the impact of potential exploitation.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/chamilo/chamilo-lms/releases/tag/v1.11.28
github.comgithub.com/chamilo/chamilo-lms/security/advisories/GHSA-c4fc-vjm9-9mvc

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitability is significant within the context of an already authenticated administrator account. Once an attacker holds such access, the unsafe PHAR deserialization can often be reliably turned into remote code execution, depending on available gadget classes and environment constraints.

The described issue is post-authentication and requires administrator-level access to Chamilo. An external attacker would first need to compromise or obtain an administrator account before attempting to exploit the unsafe deserialization.

The most robust fix pattern is to eliminate unsafe deserialization entirely from the affected code paths. Replace PHAR-based object handling and any use of unserialize() with data-only formats and parsing routines, and ensure that any remaining serialization mechanisms cannot instantiate arbitrary classes.

Prevention involves adopting a secure-by-design approach: prohibit generic deserialization APIs in application code, enforce secure coding guidelines for plugins and extensions, add automated checks for unsafe deserialization patterns in CI, and regularly review high-privilege features (such as admin virtualization tools) for dangerous data flows and over-privileged behavior.

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