Summary
A command injection vulnerability in the WSO2 Management Console allows specially crafted JDBC user-store configuration input to reach operating system command execution. If an attacker can submit or influence this configuration, arbitrary code may run on the server with the privileges of the WSO2 product.
A command injection vulnerability in the WSO2 Management Console allows specially crafted JDBC user-store configuration input to reach operating system command execution. If an attacker can submit or influence this configuration, arbitrary code may run on the server with the privileges of the WSO2 product.
Affected context
The issue occurs in WSO2 Management Console functionality that processes JDBC user-store configuration. Risk is present where an attacker can access the relevant administrative interface or otherwise influence the supplied configuration and the server processes that input without adequate command separation and validation.
The issue occurs in WSO2 Management Console functionality that processes JDBC user-store configuration. Risk is present where an attacker can access the relevant administrative interface or otherwise influence the supplied configuration and the server processes that input without adequate command separation and validation.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: WSO2 Management Console JDBC user-store configuration
- Required access: Ability to reach and submit input to the affected configuration workflow; authentication requirements depend on the deployment's access controls
- Trigger point: Server-side processing of JDBC user-store configuration
- Why exploitation is possible: Insufficient validation allows attacker-controlled values to influence operating system command execution
- Attack surface: WSO2 Management Console JDBC user-store configuration
- Required access: Ability to reach and submit input to the affected configuration workflow; authentication requirements depend on the deployment's access controls
- Trigger point: Server-side processing of JDBC user-store configuration
- Why exploitation is possible: Insufficient validation allows attacker-controlled values to influence operating system command execution
Why this happens
The underlying flaw is improper neutralization of special elements in externally supplied input used to construct or invoke operating system commands. This behavior maps to CWE-78, OS Command Injection, because data intended as configuration is not kept separate from executable command syntax, allowing crafted input to alter server-side command processing.
The underlying flaw is improper neutralization of special elements in externally supplied input used to construct or invoke operating system commands. This behavior maps to CWE-78, OS Command Injection, because data intended as configuration is not kept separate from executable command syntax, allowing crafted input to alter server-side command processing.
Potential impact
- An attacker may execute arbitrary code on the affected server
- The attacker could access, modify, or destroy application data
- The WSO2 product account may be used to affect other services or resources
- A successful compromise can lead to broader system takeover
- An attacker may execute arbitrary code on the affected server
- The attacker could access, modify, or destroy application data
- The WSO2 product account may be used to affect other services or resources
- A successful compromise can lead to broader system takeover
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on eliminating shell interpretation for configuration-derived values and reducing trust in administrative input. Secure-by-default patterns include using structured APIs or direct process interfaces instead of shell commands, applying strict allowlist validation for JDBC user-store fields, separating data from executable arguments, and rejecting unexpected characters or formats. Administrative endpoints should require strong access controls, and the WSO2 process should run with only the privileges and filesystem access it needs. Configuration changes can also be isolated, reviewed, and protected from unauthorized modification.
Mitigation generally focuses on eliminating shell interpretation for configuration-derived values and reducing trust in administrative input. Secure-by-default patterns include using structured APIs or direct process interfaces instead of shell commands, applying strict allowlist validation for JDBC user-store fields, separating data from executable arguments, and rejecting unexpected characters or formats. Administrative endpoints should require strong access controls, and the WSO2 process should run with only the privileges and filesystem access it needs. Configuration changes can also be isolated, reviewed, and protected from unauthorized modification.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches include static analysis for shell invocation APIs, string concatenation used to build commands, and configuration values passed into interpreters. Code review should examine JDBC user-store handling for missing allowlists, weak validation, and unclear trust boundaries. Runtime monitoring can alert on unexpected child processes or command interpreters launched by the WSO2 service, while policy enforcement can restrict shell execution and administrative configuration changes. Automated security review tools may help identify these patterns during development.
Detection approaches include static analysis for shell invocation APIs, string concatenation used to build commands, and configuration values passed into interpreters. Code review should examine JDBC user-store handling for missing allowlists, weak validation, and unclear trust boundaries. Runtime monitoring can alert on unexpected child processes or command interpreters launched by the WSO2 service, while policy enforcement can restrict shell execution and administrative configuration changes. Automated security review tools may help identify these patterns during development.
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
| security. | security.docs.wso2.com/ |
