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CVE-2024-14029

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

HTTP Request Smuggling (CWE-444) in Tornado Server

CVE-2024-14029

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

HTTP Request Smuggling

CWE:

CWE-444

Impact:

Request Desynchronization and Access Control Bypass

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Tornado may mishandle duplicate Transfer-Encoding: chunked headers by treating a request as having no body while parsing the chunked data as a separate request. When Tornado is deployed behind a proxy with different request parsing behavior, an attacker may desynchronize connections and perform HTTP request smuggling.

Affected context

This vulnerability can arise in Tornado deployments that process HTTP requests behind reverse proxies, load balancers, gateways, or other intermediaries. Risk depends on whether the intermediary and Tornado interpret duplicate Transfer-Encoding headers differently, allowing request boundaries to be understood inconsistently across the request path.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP services exposed through a proxy or other request intermediary
  • Required access: Ability to send crafted HTTP requests to the affected service
  • Trigger point: Processing of duplicate Transfer-Encoding: chunked headers
  • Why exploitation is possible: Tornado may disregard the duplicate transfer-encoding information while an upstream intermediary interprets the chunked body, causing inconsistent request boundaries and connection desynchronization

Why this happens

The underlying bug is inconsistent HTTP message framing when duplicate Transfer-Encoding: chunked headers are received. Tornado can interpret the request as lacking a message body and then process the chunked content as a subsequent request, while a proxy may apply different framing rules. This maps to CWE-444: Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests, in which components along the same request path disagree about where one request ends and another begins.

Potential impact

  • An attacker could bypass access controls applied by an intermediary
  • Sensitive requests or responses may be misrouted or exposed
  • Shared caches could be poisoned
  • Backend connections may become desynchronized
  • Subsequent users' requests could be affected or exposed

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on ensuring consistent, strict HTTP message-framing behavior across every intermediary and backend.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Rejecting ambiguous or duplicate transfer-encoding headers at the edge
  • Enforcing a single, well-defined request framing policy across proxies and application servers
  • Normalizing or rejecting malformed requests before forwarding them
  • Avoiding reliance on conflicting interpretations between front-end and back-end components
  • Limiting connection reuse when request framing cannot be validated safely
  • Applying least-privilege access controls so a desynchronized request has limited impact

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can identify request smuggling risks through:

  • Static and configuration analysis for inconsistent proxy and application-server framing rules
  • Code review of HTTP parsing, header normalization, and connection reuse logic
  • Integration tests that compare intermediary and backend interpretations of ambiguous requests
  • Network monitoring for duplicate transfer-encoding headers, unusual chunk boundaries, and backend connection anomalies
  • Policy enforcement that rejects ambiguous HTTP framing at ingress

Automated security testing tools may help identify discrepancies, but results should be validated against the complete deployed request path.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/tornadoweb/tornado/security/advisories/GHSA-753j-mpmx-qq6g
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/tornado-before-6.4.1-http-request-smuggling-via-transfer-encoding

Frequently asked

questions

It may be remotely exploitable when an attacker can send HTTP requests to a Tornado service whose proxy and backend parse request framing differently.

Authentication is not necessarily required. The key condition is the ability to reach the affected HTTP endpoint and submit requests that pass through the inconsistent parsing path.

Use consistent, strict request-framing rules across proxies and Tornado, and reject ambiguous duplicate transfer-encoding headers before they reach the backend.

Test the complete proxy-to-application chain, enforce HTTP parsing policies at ingress, monitor for anomalous framing, and avoid configurations that allow different components to interpret the same request differently.

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