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CVE-2023-54340

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.2)

SQL Injection in WorkOrder CMS Authentication Endpoint

CVE-2023-54340

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-89

Impact:

Authentication Bypass and Arbitrary SQL Execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.2)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

WorkOrder CMS 0.1.0 contains a SQL injection flaw in the login functionality, where the username and password parameters are concatenated directly into SQL queries without proper sanitization.

An unauthenticated attacker can manipulate these parameters (for example with OR '1'='1' or stacked queries) to bypass authentication and potentially read or modify database data or trigger administrative operations.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in the authentication layer of WorkOrder CMS 0.1.0, specifically where user-supplied username and password fields are used to build SQL statements.

It is relevant when the application:

  • Uses dynamically constructed SQL queries for login checks
  • Lacks parameterized queries or adequate input handling
  • Executes SQL in a context where stacked queries or tautologies are honored by the database

Any internet-exposed or untrusted-facing login form backed by this code path may be affected.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Public or internal login page that accepts username and password as HTTP parameters.
  • Required access: No prior authentication; basic network access to the CMS login endpoint is sufficient.
  • Trigger point: Submission of crafted login credentials that are interpolated into a SQL query.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application directly concatenates untrusted input into SQL commands, allowing attackers to:
  • Turn the WHERE clause into a tautology (e.g., OR '1'='1') to bypass authentication, and/or
  • Inject stacked SQL statements if the database and driver configuration permit multiple statements per call.

Why this happens

This issue stems from constructing SQL statements by string concatenation of user-controlled input without using parameterized queries or proper escaping.

The login logic appears to embed username and password values directly into a SQL SELECT (and potentially other) statements, which is the core pattern of CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection').

In this pattern, input fields intended to be treated as data can alter the structure and behavior of the query, enabling attackers to modify filters, union in additional result sets, or execute multiple statements, depending on database and driver capabilities.

Potential impact

  • Authentication bypass, allowing attackers to log in as arbitrary or administrative users without valid credentials.
  • Unauthorized access to sensitive data stored in the CMS database, including user records or configuration data.
  • Modification or deletion of application data, impacting integrity of work orders, content, or audit records.
  • Execution of administrative SQL commands if stacked queries are allowed (e.g., creating new admin users or changing configuration flags).
  • Potential pivot to underlying host or other systems if the database has powerful stored procedures or elevated privileges.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating direct concatenation of untrusted input in SQL and narrowing the trust boundary of authentication logic.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Using parameterized queries (prepared statements) for all database operations involving user input, especially authentication.
  • Applying strict server-side validation on authentication parameters, enforcing expected formats and rejecting unexpected metacharacters.
  • Centralizing database access through a data access layer or ORM that defaults to safe query construction patterns.
  • Restricting database account privileges so that the CMS only has the minimal permissions necessary for its operations, reducing impact of any injected statements.
  • Implementing generic error handling to avoid leaking SQL errors that can aid injection attempts, while still logging sufficient detail on the server side.

These measures should be treated as standard patterns for all input-driven database interactions, not only login.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can identify this class of issue in WorkOrder CMS or similar applications through:

  • Static analysis: Rules that flag string concatenation in SQL construction, use of raw query APIs with interpolated variables, or direct building of WHERE clauses from request parameters.
  • Code review: Manual inspection of authentication code paths to verify that login checks rely on parameterized queries and do not embed raw username/password values in SQL strings.
  • Dynamic testing: Use of web application security testing and fuzzing tools to send typical SQL injection payloads (e.g., ' OR '1'='1 and stacked query markers) to login endpoints and observe anomalous behavior.
  • Runtime monitoring: Database query logging and anomaly detection to spot unexpected query patterns, stacked statements, or unusual conditions triggered from login-related accounts.

Automated SAST and DAST tools can be integrated into CI/CD pipelines to continuously flag new instances of unsafe SQL usage.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/romzes13/WorkOrderCMS
exploit-db.comexploit-db.com/exploits/51038
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/workorder-cms-sql-injection

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. Any attacker who can reach the exposed login interface of WorkOrder CMS 0.1.0 can attempt to exploit the SQL injection without needing prior access or credentials.

Only network-level access to the CMS login endpoint is required. The vulnerability is in an unauthenticated code path, so an attacker does not need an existing account.

The most robust fix is to refactor the login queries to use parameterized statements or ORM methods that bind username and password as data parameters, eliminating direct string concatenation. At the same time, validate inputs and ensure the database user has only minimal required privileges.

Adopt a development standard that forbids raw concatenation of SQL with user input, enforce use of parameterized queries across the codebase, and add automated checks (static analysis and code review guidelines) specifically targeting SQL construction in security-critical paths such as authentication.

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