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CVE-2022-50895

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

SQL Injection in Aero CMS Author Parameter

CVE-2022-50895

Modified

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-89

Impact:

Data Exposure and Potential System Compromise

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Aero CMS 0.0.1 contains a SQL injection vulnerability in the author parameter, allowing crafted input to alter backend database queries.

When exploited using boolean-based, error-based, time-based, or UNION-based techniques, this flaw can expose sensitive data and potentially lead to full system compromise.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs where Aero CMS 0.0.1 processes the author parameter to build SQL queries for database lookups or filtering content.

The risk is present when user-controlled input is passed directly into SQL statements without sufficient validation, sanitization, or parameterization.

Installations exposed to untrusted users over HTTP/HTTPS, such as public-facing websites or multi-tenant deployments, are particularly susceptible.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Web interface endpoints that accept the author parameter (e.g., search, listing, or filtering features).
  • Required access: Ability to send HTTP requests to the affected Aero CMS instance; no special privileges are inherently required.
  • Trigger point: Submission of a crafted author value that is concatenated into an SQL query on the server side.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application dynamically constructs SQL statements using untrusted input from author without using prepared statements or robust query parameterization, allowing the input to change the query structure.

Why this happens

The core issue aligns with CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection').

The code likely constructs SQL queries by concatenating the author parameter directly into the query string instead of binding it as a typed parameter.

In this pattern, meta-characters such as quotes, comment markers, and logical operators are not neutralized, so the database interprets parts of user input as executable SQL rather than data.

This insecure design allows attackers to influence WHERE clauses, UNION clauses, and control flow of the query to exfiltrate data or alter database behavior.

Potential impact

  • Disclosure of sensitive database contents (e.g., user records, email addresses, password hashes).
  • Enumeration of database schema, including table and column names.
  • Bypassing of application-level authorization checks that rely on database filters.
  • Modification or deletion of content stored by the CMS, leading to defacement or data loss.
  • Potential creation or elevation of application accounts if user tables are manipulated.
  • In some deployments, pivoting to further compromise the underlying host or adjacent systems, depending on database privileges and configuration.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on treating all user input as untrusted and ensuring it cannot change SQL query structure.

Recommended defensive patterns include:

  • Using parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database access that involves user input, including the author parameter.
  • Applying strict server-side validation for expected fields (e.g., enforcing length limits, allowed character sets, and known value lists for author).
  • Centralizing database access through a data-access layer or ORM that discourages raw SQL string concatenation.
  • Applying least-privilege to the database account used by the CMS, limiting its ability to perform destructive operations where feasible.
  • Implementing a secure coding standard and review checklist that forbids dynamic SQL built from concatenated user input.

How teams detect issues like this

Detecting SQL injection issues in Aero CMS or similar applications can involve:

  • Static analysis rules that flag string concatenation used to build SQL queries, especially where HTTP parameters like author are involved.
  • Code reviews that focus on data access layers and verify that all queries are parameterized and validated.
  • Dynamic testing using web security scanners configured to probe the author parameter with boolean, error, time-delay, and UNION-based payload patterns.
  • Runtime monitoring of database logs for anomalous queries, such as unexpected UNION SELECT constructs, tautological WHERE clauses, or time-based functions triggered from web traffic.
  • Integrating automated security testing into CI/CD workflows to catch newly introduced injection patterns.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/nu11secur1ty/CVE-nu11secur1ty/tree/main/vendors/MegaTKC/2021/AeroCMS-v0.0.1-SQLi
web.archive.orgweb.archive.org/web/20211008092238/https://github.com/MegaTKC/AeroCMS
exploit-db.comexploit-db.com/exploits/51022
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/aero-cms-sql-injection

Frequently asked

questions

It can typically be exploited remotely by anyone who can reach the affected Aero CMS endpoints that process the author parameter, assuming no additional access controls are in place.

Not necessarily. If the vulnerable functionality is accessible without logging in, anonymous users could exploit the flaw; however, deployments that restrict access may limit exposure to authenticated or internal users.

The most robust fix is to replace any dynamic SQL string building with parameterized queries or ORM methods, combined with strict input validation on author and other fields, rather than attempting to filter out malicious characters piecemeal.

Establish a development standard that mandates parameterized queries for all database operations, enforce this through code review and automated checks, validate and constrain input at the server side, and regularly run security tests focusing on injection risks during the development lifecycle.

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