Summary
SeaCMS through version 8.7 contains an unauthenticated SQL injection vulnerability in the comment API. A remote attacker may manipulate database queries through the rlist[] parameter and retrieve database information when error-based query behavior is exposed.
SeaCMS through version 8.7 contains an unauthenticated SQL injection vulnerability in the comment API. A remote attacker may manipulate database queries through the rlist[] parameter and retrieve database information when error-based query behavior is exposed.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in SeaCMS deployments where the comment API endpoint accepts user-controlled rlist[] array values and incorporates them into database queries without adequate parameterization or validation. Risk is higher when the endpoint is publicly reachable and database errors or query results are returned to unauthenticated clients.
The vulnerability occurs in SeaCMS deployments where the comment API endpoint accepts user-controlled rlist[] array values and incorporates them into database queries without adequate parameterization or validation. Risk is higher when the endpoint is publicly reachable and database errors or query results are returned to unauthenticated clients.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Publicly reachable HTTP GET request to the SeaCMS comment API
- Required access: No authentication is generally required
- Trigger point: Processing of attacker-controlled
rlist[]values - Why exploitation is possible: Input can influence database query construction without sufficient separation between data and SQL syntax
- Attack surface: Publicly reachable HTTP GET request to the SeaCMS comment API
- Required access: No authentication is generally required
- Trigger point: Processing of attacker-controlled
rlist[]values - Why exploitation is possible: Input can influence database query construction without sufficient separation between data and SQL syntax
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an unsafe combination of externally supplied input and dynamically constructed SQL statements. When request parameters are treated as trusted query fragments instead of bound data, attackers may alter query logic or cause database evaluation of unintended expressions. This behavior maps to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection').
The underlying bug is an unsafe combination of externally supplied input and dynamically constructed SQL statements. When request parameters are treated as trusted query fragments instead of bound data, attackers may alter query logic or cause database evaluation of unintended expressions. This behavior maps to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection').
Potential impact
- An attacker could retrieve sensitive database information
- Database queries could be altered to affect application behavior
- Stored records could be modified or deleted
- Database availability could be disrupted
- Compromised data could support further application or infrastructure attacks
- An attacker could retrieve sensitive database information
- Database queries could be altered to affect application behavior
- Stored records could be modified or deleted
- Database availability could be disrupted
- Compromised data could support further application or infrastructure attacks
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on removing direct coupling between request parameters and SQL syntax.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Using parameterized queries or well-designed database abstraction layers
- Applying allowlist validation for expected array values and data types
- Avoiding dynamic SQL construction from request parameters
- Returning generic database errors without query details or diagnostic output
- Limiting the database account to the minimum permissions required by the application
- Restricting public access to administrative or unnecessary API functionality
Mitigation generally focuses on removing direct coupling between request parameters and SQL syntax.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Using parameterized queries or well-designed database abstraction layers
- Applying allowlist validation for expected array values and data types
- Avoiding dynamic SQL construction from request parameters
- Returning generic database errors without query details or diagnostic output
- Limiting the database account to the minimum permissions required by the application
- Restricting public access to administrative or unnecessary API functionality
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for:
- Static analysis findings involving string concatenation or interpolation near SQL execution calls
- Code review signals where HTTP parameters flow into query builders without binding
- Web logs showing unusual array parameters, database error responses, or repeated probing of the comment API
- Database monitoring for unexpected query structures, access patterns, or privilege use
- Policy enforcement requiring parameterized queries and input validation in application code
Automated application security and code review tools may help identify common SQL injection patterns, but findings should be validated against actual data flows.
Organizations can look for:
- Static analysis findings involving string concatenation or interpolation near SQL execution calls
- Code review signals where HTTP parameters flow into query builders without binding
- Web logs showing unusual array parameters, database error responses, or repeated probing of the comment API
- Database monitoring for unexpected query structures, access patterns, or privilege use
- Policy enforcement requiring parameterized queries and input validation in application code
Automated application security and code review tools may help identify common SQL injection patterns, but findings should be validated against actual data flows.
