Summary
TheJshen ContentManagementSystem 1.04 is vulnerable to SQL injection through the id GET parameter, allowing untrusted user input to directly influence database queries.
An attacker who can send crafted HTTP requests to the application may leverage boolean-based, time-based, or UNION-based SQL injection techniques to read or modify data in the underlying database.
Affected context
This vulnerability appears in HTTP endpoints that use the id GET parameter to look up records in the database.
It is relevant where:
- User-controlled input from URL query parameters is concatenated into SQL statements
- No effective parameterization, escaping, or validation is applied
- The database account used by the application has permissions to read or modify sensitive tables
The risk is heightened on Internet-exposed deployments or where database access controls are broad.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Public or internal web interface of TheJshen ContentManagementSystem 1.04
- Required access: Ability to send HTTP requests and control the
idquery parameter (no prior authentication necessarily required, depending on deployment) - Trigger point: Backend code that builds SQL queries using the
idparameter in WHERE or other clauses - Why exploitation is possible: The
idparameter is incorporated into SQL statements without proper parameterization or neutralization, enabling crafted input to alter query structure and logic
Why this happens
The root cause aligns with CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command (SQL Injection).
Application code appears to construct SQL queries by directly concatenating the id GET parameter into the query string, treating user input as trusted.
Without prepared statements or robust input handling, attackers can inject control characters (such as quotes, logical operators, and UNION clauses) so that the database interprets the input as part of the SQL command rather than as data.
Potential impact
- May allow extraction of sensitive data from application tables
- Could enable reading of other databases accessible to the same DB user
- May allow modification or deletion of application data (integrity compromise)
- Could enable creation of new accounts or privilege escalation within the application, depending on schema
- Can potentially be chained with other weaknesses to gain further access to the underlying host environment
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on treating all external input as untrusted and separating data from SQL logic.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Using parameterized queries / prepared statements for all database access involving user input
- Applying strict server-side validation and type enforcement on identifiers such as
id(e.g., integer-only checks) - Centralizing database access through a data access layer that enforces safe query construction
- Limiting the privileges of the database account used by the application to the minimum required
- Implementing generic error handling so database errors do not leak detailed information that assists injection
How teams detect issues like this
Detection typically involves a combination of code-centric and runtime approaches:
- Static analysis rules that flag string concatenation of request parameters into SQL statements
- Manual code reviews focused on controllers or handlers that process
idand other query parameters for database access - Security testing (including automated DAST or manual penetration testing) that probes parameters for boolean-based and time-based SQL injection behavior
- Logging and monitoring for unusual query patterns, frequent errors, or anomalous timing behavior that may indicate exploitation attempts
Automated SAST/IAST tools can assist in identifying unsafe query construction patterns across the codebase.

