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CVE-2019-25299

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

SQL Injection in RimbaLinux AhadPOS alamatCustomer Parameter

CVE-2019-25299

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-89

Impact:

Database Compromise / Data Exfiltration

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

RimbaLinux AhadPOS 1.11 is vulnerable to SQL injection via the alamatCustomer parameter, where crafted POST requests can alter backend SQL queries.

By using time-based and boolean-based blind techniques, an attacker may extract sensitive data or interact with the underlying database without direct query feedback.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in AhadPOS 1.11 wherever the alamatCustomer field is processed and incorporated into SQL statements.

It is relevant in deployments where user-supplied customer address data from POST requests is concatenated directly into SQL queries without sufficient validation or parameterization.

The risk is higher when the application server can reach a production database containing sensitive business or customer information, and when database credentials grant broad privileges.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP endpoints that accept POST requests containing the alamatCustomer field.
  • Required access: Network access to the AhadPOS web interface; no special privileges are assumed beyond being able to submit forms or POST data.
  • Trigger point: Server-side code that constructs and executes SQL queries using the alamatCustomer value.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application appears to interpolate untrusted input directly into SQL statements without using parameterized queries or robust input handling, enabling an attacker to influence query structure and logic.

Why this happens

The underlying bug class is SQL injection, mapped to CWE-89, where unchecked input is embedded directly into SQL commands.

Instead of treating the alamatCustomer value as data bound through prepared statements, the application code likely constructs query strings through string concatenation or similar mechanisms.

This pattern allows attackers to introduce control characters, operators, or additional clauses that change the intended semantics of the query, even in blind contexts where results are inferred through response timing or conditional behavior.

Potential impact

  • The attacker may read or infer sensitive information stored in the database (customer data, transaction records, or configuration values).
  • The attacker could modify or delete records, impacting data integrity and business operations.
  • The attacker may be able to create or modify application accounts or roles if the schema allows it.
  • Under certain database configurations, the attacker could potentially execute administrative operations or pivot to other systems accessible from the database host.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on separating data from code in database interactions and constraining what input is acceptable.

Recommended defensive patterns include:

  • Using parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database access, ensuring user input is always treated as data, not executable SQL.
  • Applying strict server-side validation and normalization for address fields (such as length limits and character whitelisting) while recognizing that validation complements, but does not replace, safe query construction.
  • Centralizing database access in a data access layer with consistently enforced secure patterns rather than ad-hoc query building.
  • Applying least-privilege principles to database accounts so that the application's credentials have only the minimal permissions required for its operations.
  • Implementing error-handling and response patterns that do not expose detailed database error messages, reducing inadvertent exposure of schema details.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically combines code-centric and runtime approaches:

  • Static analysis rules that flag concatenation of HTTP request parameters (including alamatCustomer) into SQL strings, especially within data access code or controllers.
  • Targeted security-focused code reviews looking for direct string interpolation in query construction, absence of prepared statements, and inconsistent input validation on database-facing fields.
  • Web application firewall (WAF) or reverse-proxy rules that monitor and optionally block suspicious SQL-like patterns in POST bodies, while logging activity for follow-up.
  • Database activity monitoring that alerts on anomalous query patterns, such as unusual use of logical operators, timing functions, or tautological conditions, which often accompany blind SQL injection probing.
  • Integration of automated security testing tools (e.g., SAST/DAST) into CI/CD pipelines to regularly scan for SQL injection patterns and regressions.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/rimbalinux/AhadPOS
exploit-db.comexploit-db.com/exploits/47585
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/rimbalinux-ahadpos-alamatcustomer-sql-injection

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. Anyone who can reach the AhadPOS web interface over the network and submit POST requests with the alamatCustomer parameter may attempt to exploit the issue, subject to any authentication or access controls present on the affected endpoint.

It depends on how AhadPOS is deployed and which pages process the alamatCustomer input. If the affected functionality is exposed to unauthenticated users, no login is required; if it is behind a login, an attacker would need at least that level of access to submit crafted requests.

The most robust fix is to adopt parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database operations, ensuring that user-supplied input like alamatCustomer is always passed as bound parameters rather than concatenated into SQL strings. This should be combined with defining clear data models and centralizing query construction in a secure data access layer.

Establish development practices and coding standards that mandate parameterized queries, consistent input validation, and code review of all data-access logic. Complement these with automated static analysis rules for SQL injection, security checks in CI pipelines, and periodic security testing to quickly identify and remediate unsafe patterns before release.

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