Summary
html5_snmp 1.11 contains SQL injection flaws that allow crafted values in the Router_ID and Router_IP parameters to alter backend database queries.
When these parameters are not safely handled, an attacker may use error-based, time-based, or union-based techniques to extract or modify database data.
Affected context
This vulnerability occurs in html5_snmp 1.11 wherever Router_ID and Router_IP parameters are accepted from HTTP requests and incorporated into SQL queries.
It is most relevant in deployments where user-supplied router identifiers or addresses are passed directly into query strings without robust parameterization or sanitization.
Any interface that allows an untrusted user to influence these parameters—such as search, filtering, or router lookup forms—can expose the issue if the backend logic uses dynamic SQL construction.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Web interface or HTTP API endpoints that process Router_ID and Router_IP parameters.
- Required access: Ability to send HTTP requests to the affected endpoints (typically unauthenticated or low-privilege authenticated access, depending on deployment).
- Trigger point: Submission of specially crafted Router_ID or Router_IP values that are embedded into SQL statements.
- Why exploitation is possible: The application constructs SQL queries using untrusted parameter values without parameterized queries or equivalent protections, allowing control over query structure and predicates.
Why this happens
The underlying issue is unsafe construction of SQL statements from untrusted input, directly mapping to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection').
Instead of separating data from code with prepared statements or bound parameters, the application appears to concatenate Router_ID and Router_IP values into query strings.
This pattern lets attackers inject SQL syntax—such as additional conditions, UNION clauses, or timing functions—so the database executes unintended logic, enabling data disclosure or modification beyond the original query intent.
Potential impact
- Attackers may extract sensitive information from database tables using error-based or union-based injection.
- Attackers may modify or delete records, leading to data loss or corruption.
- Attackers may create or escalate application accounts if authentication or authorization data is stored in the affected database.
- Attackers may infer database structure and configuration, aiding further attacks.
- In some environments, attackers may leverage database features to execute server-side operations, depending on configuration and privileges.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on isolating untrusted input from SQL execution and reducing trust in client-controlled parameters:
- Use parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database interactions involving Router_ID, Router_IP, and similar parameters.
- Define strict input validation rules for router identifiers and IP addresses (e.g., numeric IDs, CIDR/IP patterns) and reject or normalize values outside expected formats.
- Centralize database access in a data access layer that enforces safe query construction patterns by default.
- Minimize database privileges for the application user account so that even if a query is abused, the reachable data and operations are limited.
- Apply least-privilege and segmentation at the database level, separating sensitive tables from routine operational data where feasible.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection can combine code-level inspection with runtime testing:
- Use static analysis rules to flag string concatenation or formatting operations that build SQL queries from HTTP parameters such as Router_ID and Router_IP.
- During code review, look for inline SQL statements and verify that all external inputs are bound as parameters, not injected into query text.
- Implement security testing (including automated SQL injection scanners and manual penetration testing) against endpoints handling router-related parameters.
- Apply application-layer security policies (e.g., in a WAF or API gateway) that monitor for typical SQL injection patterns and anomalies in query-related parameters.
- Integrate automated code review tools into CI pipelines to enforce consistent use of safe query construction patterns.

