Summary
MetInfo CMS versions 6.0.0 through before 6.1.1 contain a path traversal vulnerability in the /include/thumb.php endpoint. An unauthenticated attacker may be able to read arbitrary files by supplying crafted values to the dir parameter, particularly where backslash-based filtering can be bypassed on Windows systems.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in MetInfo CMS deployments using the affected thumbnail-handling endpoint. Risk is present when the endpoint accepts attacker-controlled path data, applies incomplete filtering, and uses that data to access files without reliably constraining the resolved path to an intended directory.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The
/include/thumb.phpHTTP endpoint - Required access: No authentication may be required
- Trigger point: Processing of attacker-controlled input supplied through the
dirparameter - Why exploitation is possible: Insufficient path canonicalization and filter bypass conditions can allow the requested path to escape its intended directory
Why this happens
The underlying flaw is improper limitation of a user-controlled filesystem path. Filtering based on simple string replacement does not provide reliable path containment because alternate separators, canonicalization behavior, and platform-specific path handling may produce a different effective path.
This maps to CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal'), where application input influences file access without a robust, canonical containment check.
Potential impact
- An attacker may read sensitive application or operating-system files
- Database credentials and other configuration secrets could be exposed
- Disclosure of source code may support follow-on attacks
- Exposed credentials could enable unauthorized access to connected services
- The CMS environment could face increased risk of broader compromise
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on removing direct trust in user-supplied filesystem paths.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Resolve paths canonically and verify that the result remains within an explicitly permitted base directory
- Prefer server-generated file identifiers or allowlisted resource names over raw path input
- Reject traversal indicators and platform-specific separator variants as an additional defense, not as the sole control
- Apply strict input validation before any filesystem operation
- Restrict the web process to the minimum filesystem permissions required
- Keep sensitive configuration files outside web-accessible or user-controlled directories
- Use secure-by-default file-handling APIs that enforce directory boundaries
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for path traversal risks through:
- Static analysis rules identifying filesystem calls that receive request parameters
- Code review checks for string-replacement filtering used as a path-security control
- Tests covering canonicalization, alternate separators, encoded input, and platform-specific path behavior
- Web application logs showing unusual values submitted to file or directory parameters
- Runtime policies restricting the application process from reading sensitive filesystem locations
- Automated security review tools that flag user-controlled paths lacking containment validation

