Summary
Smartshop 1 contains a SQL injection vulnerability in the id parameter of product.php, allowing unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary SQL queries.
By sending crafted GET requests with union-based payloads, an attacker can extract sensitive database information such as usernames and database names.
Affected context
This vulnerability appears in the product details functionality of Smartshop 1, specifically when requests are made to product.php with an id parameter.
It manifests when the application directly concatenates the user-supplied id value into SQL statements without proper validation, sanitization, or parameterization.
The issue is reachable over HTTP/HTTPS, and is present when deployments expose the product page publicly and rely on a relational database backend.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Public web interface, via HTTP GET requests to
product.php. - Required access: No authentication required; any remote user can reach the vulnerable endpoint.
- Trigger point: The
idquery parameter is processed and embedded into a SQL query executed by the database. - Why exploitation is possible: The application constructs SQL queries by concatenating the raw
idparameter value, allowing attackers to inject additional SQL fragments (e.g., using UNION) that the database executes as part of the query.
Why this happens
The root cause aligns with CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection').
Instead of using parameterized queries or prepared statements, the code appears to build SQL statements by interpolating the id parameter directly into the query string.
Without proper escaping, validation, or type enforcement, special characters and SQL keywords in the id value alter the intended query structure, enabling attackers to append or modify clauses and retrieve arbitrary data.
Potential impact
- Unauthorized reading of sensitive database data, including usernames and database names.
- Discovery of database schema details that may facilitate further attacks.
- Potential exposure of customer information, product data, or other confidential records, depending on database contents.
- Use of extracted data (e.g., usernames) to attempt broader system compromise through credential reuse or targeted attacks.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation typically focuses on removing direct string concatenation from database access code and strictly controlling how user input reaches SQL engines.
Common secure patterns include:
- Using parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database interactions, ensuring user input is treated as data, not executable SQL.
- Enforcing strict type checks (e.g., ensuring
idis an integer) and rejecting or normalizing values that do not conform to expected formats. - Applying centralized input validation and encoding routines for all externally supplied data before it influences query construction.
- Limiting database privileges of the application account to only the operations and tables required, reducing the blast radius if an injection occurs.
- Implementing defense-in-depth controls such as application-level access control checks and minimizing exposure of detailed error messages.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection can leverage both preventative and retrospective techniques:
- Static analysis rules that flag dynamic SQL construction patterns, such as string concatenation involving request parameters or other untrusted inputs.
- Code review checklists focused on verifying that all database calls use parameterized queries and that no user-controlled data is directly embedded in SQL strings.
- Runtime monitoring or web application firewalls (WAFs) configured with policies to detect and alert on suspicious query patterns, such as UNION-based injections or anomalous error responses.
- Logging and anomaly detection on database queries, looking for unusual or complex statements originating from the application's normal traffic paths.

