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CVE-2018-25332

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Authentication and Authorization Weakness in GitBucket

CVE-2018-25332

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Authentication and Authorization Weakness

CWE:

CWE-306

Impact:

Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

GitBucket 4.23.1 contains an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability where weak secret token generation and missing authentication controls around plugin upload can be chained to run arbitrary system commands.

By brute-forcing the Blowfish-based secret key and abusing the git‑lfs upload path, an attacker can upload a malicious plugin JAR and trigger its execution via an exposed endpoint, achieving full remote compromise of the GitBucket host process.

Affected context

The issue arises in GitBucket instances that:

  • Expose the Git LFS endpoint and plugin handling features over the network
  • Rely on a Blowfish-derived secret token that is predictable or brute-forceable
  • Allow plugin JARs to be uploaded and loaded without robust authentication and integrity checks
  • Provide an HTTP-accessible endpoint that can trigger plugin code paths

In this context, GitBucket operates as a network-facing Git service with extensible plugin support, but critical operations around plugin upload and activation are not sufficiently protected by strong authentication or secret management.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-accessible GitBucket instance with Git LFS and plugin functionality enabled.
  • Required access: No prior authentication is strictly required; the attacker needs only the ability to reach the GitBucket HTTP(S) interface.
  • Trigger point: Crafting requests that:
  • Brute-force or derive the Blowfish-based secret token used to authorize sensitive operations
  • Upload a malicious plugin JAR via the git-lfs endpoint or associated upload mechanism
  • Invoke an exploit or plugin-related endpoint that loads and executes plugin code
  • Why exploitation is possible:
  • Secret token generation is weak enough to be brute-forced or predicted.
  • Sensitive plugin upload and loading paths lack robust authentication and authorization checks (CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function).
  • Uploaded plugin JARs are treated as trusted code and executed with the privileges of the GitBucket server process.

Why this happens

At its core, the vulnerability stems from treating critical administrative functionality as if it were a low-risk, semi-public API surface:

  • The system relies on a Blowfish-based secret token that is not generated or managed with sufficient entropy and protection, making it susceptible to brute force.
  • Critical operations—such as plugin upload and activation—do not enforce strong, context-appropriate authentication or strict authorization checks (CWE-306).
  • The plugin mechanism executes arbitrary code from uploaded JAR files under the server's privileges, but the path that leads to uploading and triggering these plugins is not adequately constrained.

Abstractly, this pattern maps to a combination of weak secret management and missing authentication on privileged endpoints, where a nominally "internal" execution feature is directly reachable from unauthenticated network input.

Potential impact

  • Full remote code execution with the privileges of the GitBucket server process
  • Complete compromise of the Git repository hosting environment and its data
  • Theft, tampering, or deletion of hosted source code and associated metadata
  • Establishment of persistent backdoors through malicious plugins or modified configuration
  • Lateral movement within the hosting server or internal network, depending on environment hardening
  • Use of the compromised GitBucket instance as a pivot point for supply-chain attacks on downstream developers and CI/CD systems

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on strengthening authentication for critical operations and constraining plugin execution capabilities:

  • Enforce strict authentication and authorization on any endpoint that:
  • Accepts plugin uploads or configuration
  • Influences server-side code execution paths
  • Use cryptographically strong, non-predictable secrets and keys, generated via modern secure random APIs and rotated periodically.
  • Treat plugin upload as an administrative operation:
  • Require explicit admin credentials
  • Consider multi-step or out-of-band approval workflows for new plugins
  • Reduce reliance on dynamically loaded, arbitrary plugins; prefer vetted, bundled extensions or sandboxed plugin systems where possible.
  • Run the GitBucket service under a dedicated, least-privileged account with restricted filesystem access to narrow the blast radius of any code execution.
  • Place GitBucket behind additional layers such as reverse proxies or WAFs that can enforce request-level policies on sensitive paths.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can leverage both code-centric and operational approaches:

  • Static analysis and code review:
  • Flag controllers or routes that perform sensitive actions (e.g., plugin upload, dynamic code loading) without robust authentication checks.
  • Identify uses of weak or home-grown secret/token generation, especially where keys are derived from predictable data or low-entropy sources.
  • Look for plugin loading mechanisms that accept external input without strict provenance validation.
  • Configuration and policy checks:
  • Enforce policies that require authentication decorators/filters on all administrative endpoints.
  • Require high-entropy secrets and key management policies (e.g., minimum length, cryptographic randomness).
  • Runtime monitoring:
  • Monitor logs for anomalous plugin upload activity, especially from unauthenticated or unusual sources.
  • Alert on unexpected invocation of plugin-related endpoints, particularly when followed by shell or process execution from the GitBucket process.
  • Automated security testing tools (SAST/DAST) can be configured to probe for unauthenticated access to critical endpoints and to evaluate the strength and use of secret tokens.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/gitbucket/gitbucket
security.szurek.plsecurity.szurek.pl/
exploit-db.comexploit-db.com/exploits/44668
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/gitbucket-unauthenticated-remote-code-execution

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. If the GitBucket instance is exposed over the network and the vulnerable endpoints are reachable, an attacker can exploit the issue remotely without valid credentials, assuming they can successfully derive or brute-force the secret token.

No, the described chain relies on missing or insufficient authentication for critical functionality and weak secret generation. An unauthenticated attacker who can reach the service and perform token brute-forcing can proceed to plugin upload and execution.

Protect all critical operations—such as code or plugin upload, configuration changes, and execution triggers—with strong, consistently enforced authentication and authorization. Combine this with robust, high-entropy secret management and a more constrained or sandboxed plugin execution model.

When designing administrative or execution-related features, assume all network input is untrusted: require explicit authentication on every critical endpoint, follow best practices for cryptographic key and token generation, minimize dynamic code loading, and subject extensibility mechanisms (like plugins) to strict security review and least-privilege constraints.

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