Summary
Redaxo CMS Addon MyEvents 2.2.1 contains a SQL injection flaw in the myevents_id parameter that allows authenticated users to inject arbitrary SQL into backend queries.
By sending crafted GET requests to event_add.php with malicious myevents_id values, an attacker can read or modify sensitive data stored in the application's database.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in the Redaxo CMS MyEvents addon when handling the myevents_id parameter in requests to event_add.php.
It affects deployments where:
- The MyEvents addon version 2.2.1 is installed and active
- Authenticated users can access or trigger
event_add.php - Database queries are built directly from request parameters without strict validation or parameterization
The risk is present primarily in environments where authenticated users have network access to the Redaxo backend.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: HTTP(S) interface to the Redaxo CMS MyEvents addon, specifically
event_add.php - Required access: Authenticated access to the CMS with permissions sufficient to reach the MyEvents functionality
- Trigger point: A GET request to
event_add.phpcontaining a craftedmyevents_idvalue - Why exploitation is possible: The
myevents_idparameter is concatenated directly into SQL statements without proper parameterization or robust input validation, allowing attacker-controlled tokens to alter the intended query structure.
Why this happens
This issue stems from constructing SQL queries by directly embedding user-supplied input from the myevents_id parameter into the query string.
Instead of using prepared statements or bound parameters, the code likely builds SQL via string concatenation, trusting that myevents_id contains only expected values (such as numeric identifiers).
This pattern aligns with CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'), where control characters such as quotes, comments, and operators are not neutralized, enabling attackers to inject or modify SQL logic.
Potential impact
- Extraction of sensitive information from application tables (e.g., user records, configuration data)
- Unauthorized modification or deletion of event-related data
- Broader tampering with database content impacting the integrity of the CMS
- Potential discovery of credential hashes or other security-sensitive metadata
- In some configurations, potential impact on availability through destructive queries (such as table truncation)
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation typically focuses on eliminating direct use of untrusted input in SQL and enforcing strict query construction practices:
- Use parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database interactions involving user-controlled input, including
myevents_id. - Treat all request parameters as untrusted and validate them against strict allowlists (e.g., numeric-only for identifiers, fixed sets for enumerations).
- Centralize database access behind an abstraction layer that enforces parameter binding by default.
- Apply least-privilege database roles so that the CMS account only has the minimum required operations (e.g., no schema-altering privileges).
- Implement defense-in-depth with application-level access controls, limiting which authenticated users can interact with sensitive addon endpoints.
How teams detect issues like this
Effective detection combines code-level analysis with runtime monitoring:
- Use static analysis to detect SQL string concatenation patterns that include request parameters like
$_GET['myevents_id']or equivalent framework variables. - During code review, flag any direct embedding of user-supplied data into SQL and enforce a coding standard that mandates prepared statements.
- Employ application security testing tools (SAST/DAST) configured with rules for SQL injection in PHP or the language used by the addon.
- Monitor database logs for anomalous queries that contain comment markers, tautologies, or unexpected concatenated fragments associated with the MyEvents addon.

