Summary
FooSun DotNetCMS 1.0 and 2.0 contain a SQL injection flaw in the CityId parameter processed by the City_ajax.aspx endpoint. An unauthenticated attacker may manipulate MSSQL queries to retrieve database information when request input is concatenated into SQL without sufficient validation or parameterization.
FooSun DotNetCMS 1.0 and 2.0 contain a SQL injection flaw in the CityId parameter processed by the City_ajax.aspx endpoint. An unauthenticated attacker may manipulate MSSQL queries to retrieve database information when request input is concatenated into SQL without sufficient validation or parameterization.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in the DotNetCMS city lookup functionality exposed through /user/City_ajax.aspx. It becomes risky when the CityId request parameter reaches the MSSQL query without being safely bound or constrained, and when the endpoint is accessible without authentication.
The vulnerability occurs in the DotNetCMS city lookup functionality exposed through /user/City_ajax.aspx. It becomes risky when the CityId request parameter reaches the MSSQL query without being safely bound or constrained, and when the endpoint is accessible without authentication.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: HTTP GET request to the city lookup endpoint
- Required access: No authentication may be required if the endpoint is publicly reachable
- Trigger point: Processing of the CityId parameter
- Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled input is incorporated into an MSSQL query without reliable parameterization or equivalent query isolation
- Attack surface: HTTP GET request to the city lookup endpoint
- Required access: No authentication may be required if the endpoint is publicly reachable
- Trigger point: Processing of the CityId parameter
- Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled input is incorporated into an MSSQL query without reliable parameterization or equivalent query isolation
Why this happens
The underlying bug is SQL injection, mapped to CWE-89. The application treats a request parameter as both data and part of a database command by concatenating it into a SQL statement. This breaks the intended separation between query structure and user-provided values, allowing crafted input to alter query behavior.
The underlying bug is SQL injection, mapped to CWE-89. The application treats a request parameter as both data and part of a database command by concatenating it into a SQL statement. This breaks the intended separation between query structure and user-provided values, allowing crafted input to alter query behavior.
Potential impact
- Unauthorized disclosure of database records or metadata
- Exposure of sensitive application or user information
- Circumvention of intended query restrictions
- Potential modification or deletion of database data if write-capable query paths are reachable
- Further compromise through exposed credentials or operational information
- Unauthorized disclosure of database records or metadata
- Exposure of sensitive application or user information
- Circumvention of intended query restrictions
- Potential modification or deletion of database data if write-capable query paths are reachable
- Further compromise through exposed credentials or operational information
General mitigation guidance
Defensive design typically focuses on preserving a strict boundary between application input and SQL commands.
Common mitigation patterns include:
- Using parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database access
- Replacing dynamically concatenated SQL with safe data-access abstractions
- Applying allowlist validation and appropriate type constraints to identifier parameters
- Ensuring database accounts have only the permissions required by the endpoint
- Limiting unauthenticated access to data-returning endpoints where business requirements permit
- Avoiding detailed database errors in client-facing responses
- Treating all request parameters as untrusted, including values that appear numeric
Defensive design typically focuses on preserving a strict boundary between application input and SQL commands.
Common mitigation patterns include:
- Using parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database access
- Replacing dynamically concatenated SQL with safe data-access abstractions
- Applying allowlist validation and appropriate type constraints to identifier parameters
- Ensuring database accounts have only the permissions required by the endpoint
- Limiting unauthenticated access to data-returning endpoints where business requirements permit
- Avoiding detailed database errors in client-facing responses
- Treating all request parameters as untrusted, including values that appear numeric
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches may include:
- Static analysis rules identifying string concatenation or interpolation in SQL construction
- Code review checks for request parameters passed directly to database APIs
- Dynamic testing with controlled metacharacter and query-manipulation probes in non-production environments
- Web application firewall or gateway policies that flag anomalous database-oriented request patterns
- Database monitoring for unexpected query structures, enumeration behavior, or excessive metadata access
- Automated security review tools that identify missing parameter binding and weak input validation
Detection approaches may include:
- Static analysis rules identifying string concatenation or interpolation in SQL construction
- Code review checks for request parameters passed directly to database APIs
- Dynamic testing with controlled metacharacter and query-manipulation probes in non-production environments
- Web application firewall or gateway policies that flag anomalous database-oriented request patterns
- Database monitoring for unexpected query structures, enumeration behavior, or excessive metadata access
- Automated security review tools that identify missing parameter binding and weak input validation
